Towards Co-Resilience: What the United States and South Korea Can Do Together in an Era of U.S.–China Rivalry
Institute for Future Strategy, Seoul National University — U.S.–China Relations Task Force
“Towards Co-Resilience: What the United States and South Korea Can Do Together in an Era of U.S.–China Rivalry”
China today displays both external assertiveness and internal unease—two dynamics that can reinforce each other. To respond effectively to the challenge posed by China, the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) must recognize the persistent risks and potential disruptions spreading across global networks and systems. Within the broader framework of U.S.–China strategic competition, the two countries need to build a collective capacity for rapid recovery, or “co-resilience.” Together with other like-minded nations, the U.S. and Korea can work to deter coercive exercises of power by potential adversaries. Strengthening the resilience of supply chains, advanced technology clusters, military alliance networks, and maritime routes that connect the two countries will be essential. Such a holistic approach to addressing vulnerabilities in multi-layered networks will contribute to greater prosperity and security in the international community amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry.
The new U.S. administration should enhance supply chain resilience in partnership with Korea through initiatives such as a U.S.–ROK Shipbuilding Alliance and the Alternative Asia Supply Chain (Altasia) framework. The two countries can also establish a Multilateral AI Research Institute (MARI) and expand the current CHIP-4 alliance into a more integrated coalition of allied technology partners, thereby laying the foundation for a core technological alliance. Moreover, the U.S. and Korea can work closely in shaping the norms and rules of global governance in emerging fields.
In the Indo-Pacific region, both nations can deepen cooperation to strengthen maritime resilience and uphold a rules-based order together with countries that share similar democratic values. They must jointly deter any attempts to unilaterally alter the status quo through military or coercive means. Korea should actively participate in the U.S.-led Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF), helping shorten naval maintenance cycles and expand its defense industry contracts. The U.S. and Korea can also play leading roles in promoting multilateral maritime security cooperation alongside regional partners such as Japan, Australia, and ASEAN. Regarding the Taiwan Strait, Washington should institutionalize strategic consultations with Seoul and Tokyo to enhance preparedness and coordination.
The new U.S. administration should resume denuclearization negotiations with North Korea in parallel with nuclear arms reduction talks involving China and Russia. The U.S. should also approve Korea’s low-level uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing under the U.S.–ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, in order to reduce Korea’s dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and promote joint nuclear power plant exports to third countries. Finally, the U.S. strategy of multi-domain integrated deterrence should be closely linked with its extended deterrence commitment to South Korea. Washington could reinforce the credibility of extended deterrence by introducing a mechanism similar to NATO’s nuclear-sharing model and by strengthening coordination through Presidential Statements and National Security Council (NSC) consultations.
Keywords:
U.S.–China strategic competition, multi-layered networks, holistic approach, supply chain resilience, U.S.–ROK shipbuilding alliance, economic security, advanced technology alliance, Indo-Pacific strategy, maritime security cooperation, low-enriched uranium, spent fuel reprocessing, North Korea denuclearization, nuclear cooperation agreement, extended deterrence, multi-domain integrated deterrence
