R&D Goals and Content
□ Establish a nationwide integrated reporting and response system for multi-victim fraud crimes
◯ Case review: Identify the status of integrated reporting and response systems adopted by major countries to proactively prevent the recent surge in multi-victim fraud and to respond effectively to crimes already committed; compare these systems with Korea’s current framework to draw policy implications.
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Cases in major countries
▷ United Kingdom: Operates a nationwide response system and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB).
▷ Singapore: Established an Anti-Scam Centre (June 2019).
▷ Canada: Operates the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre.
□ Current status in Korea
○ Opening of the Integrated Reporting and Response Center for Voice Phishing
⇨ Pursuant to a Prime Ministerial Directive, the center has been in official operation since October 4, 2023, and a legal basis provision (Article 2-7) has been created in the Act on the Refund of Losses from Telecommunication-based Financial Frauds, scheduled to take effect on August 28, 2024.
－ Previously fragmented channels—police reports (112), civil counseling without losses (182), fake website reports to KISA (118), and refund requests / voice-phishing tip counseling to the Financial Supervisory Service (1332)—are now consolidated: once a victim dials 112 and is connected to the Integrated Reporting and Response Center for Telecommunication-based Financial Fraud, all related reports can be handled one-stop at the center.
－ In addition to police, telecom and financial institution personnel work together at the center; telecom advisors and financial advisors are assigned so financial-response and telecom-response teams can operate jointly.
－ Advance the blocking system for tools used in telecommunication-based financial fraud.
－ The core of the response is the immediate blocking of four telecom means upon report: phone numbers, malicious apps, KakaoTalk accounts, and illegal relay devices. In particular, whenever such means are identified during intake or investigation, immediate blocking must be executed to prevent further spread of fraud.
－ Strengthen collaboration with financial institutions and diversify prevention activities.
－ Financial institutions must report large-amount cash withdrawals to 112 so local police can respond and block in-person swindle-type voice phishing.
－ Diversify prevention efforts by producing easy-to-understand videos explaining voice-phishing methods and the entire crime process, and disseminating them via YouTube, TV, public transit, cinemas, billboards, and online shorts, etc.
□ Need to expand Korea’s integrated response to multi-victim fraud
◯ Problems with fragmented / siloed responses
－ While criminal organizations act in a tightly coordinated manner under centralized leadership, the government’s responsibilities are split among telecom, finance, and law enforcement. Even when a victim receives a voice-phishing call and confirms a mule-account number, they have had to contact telecoms for phone numbers, financial institutions for accounts, and police for investigation separately, revealing the limits of a fragmented response.
－ The fragmented system must be overhauled to build a governance framework capable of comprehensive response—from report intake and blocking telecom numbers and financial accounts, to arrests and victim support.
◯ Need for preemptive blocking and comprehensive response
－ Telecom side: Modus operandi has evolved from international calls to internet telephony, then to number-spoofing relay devices, and most recently to mass “bait-text” blasts.
－ Financial side: Progressed from bank transfers to mule accounts, then to in-person hand-offs, and now often coercing purchases of gift cards, gold bars, and virtual assets, with the latest methods using easy-remittance services.
－ As voice phishing and other multi-victim fraud crimes continuously evolve, ongoing victimization is expected. Therefore, in addition to rapid, method-specific blocking, a comprehensive, multi-layered, and coordinated response is needed—covering international cooperation, information-sharing, and legal/regulatory improvements—to eradicate not only domestic schemes but also cross-border money-laundering.
□ Need for legal and institutional improvements to ensure practical operation, efficiency, and sustainability of the integrated multi-victim fraud reporting and response system described above
◯ Research goals and content:
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To respond effectively to multi-victim fraud that devastates ordinary people’s livelihoods, Korea must shift from individual, enforcement- and arrest-centric approaches to an integrated, block- and prevention-centric system.
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To this end, emphasize the need for a legal foundation such as the tentatively titled “Basic Act on Fraud Prevention”, which was pursued in the 21st National Assembly.
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Analyze and propose items that must be included in such legislation:
△ A conceptual definition of multi-victim fraud broad enough to encompass evolving crime patterns—beyond what is covered by the current Telecommunications-based Financial Fraud Refund Act—including gift-card PIN / theft-type phone-finance fraud, cyber fraud (which accounts for most telecommunication-based financial fraud), investment “leading room” scams, and romance scams;
△ Establishment of a Multi-Victim Fraud Reporting and Response Agency for integrated response;
△ Preemptive blocking of instruments used in crimes—accounts, phone numbers, etc.—upon a multi-victim fraud report to prevent additional offenses (including granting the Agency authority to request provisional measures from financial institutions);
△ Support measures for reporting victims;
△ Building a national alert and early-warning system based on the integrated compilation and analysis of report data. -
Identify additional provisions in related existing statutes that require amendment and propose alternatives.
